Re: [s-d] [s-b] Contract for the Purposes of Personhood Definition Exploration (PftPoPDE)

[Craig Daniel <teucer@xxxxxxxxx>]

On Sun, Nov 1, 2009 at 7:08 PM, Kerim Aydin <kerim@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> While Agoran precedent is not applicable here, the arguments that personhood
> applies to a contract don't depend on any particular Agoran Rule, and could
> be transferred here (http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=1623).
>

These arguments seem relevant. However, I'm not convinced. The B rule
currently refers to the legal definition of "[a]ny term primarily used
in mathematical or legal contexts..." I think you'd be hard-pressed to
argue that the word "person" is *primarily* used in a legal context
(or a mathematical one). It certainly has a meaning in legal contexts,
but it also has a meaning in, say, linguistics; although the rule
refers to math and law but not science, even if scientific contexts
were relevant I'd refuse to imagine that the rules describe a game
played by grammatical persons. Similarly, the legal definition of
person appears to only be relevant if the term is primarily a legal
one. Any other term has its ordinary-language meaning, and I am
inclined to believe that "person" falls into this category.

Game custom seems like the way to resolve this question. In terms of
direct effects on the game of definitions of "person" it seems like a
wash; we have formerly understood that the set of individuals eligible
to play under rules not substantially different in meaning from the
current ones about "people" was the same as the set of individuals who
could pass the Turing test and could write e-mail in English.
Obviously this excludes a great many persons, and depending on the
specifics of the ordinary-language speaker it generally also includes
some non-persons (I personally consider hypothetical sentient AIs to
be people, but do not agree that any being which passes the Turing
test is ipso facto proved sentient and thus a person), but it does not
include contracts. With regards to whether contracts are persons,
however, I believe the answer has most recently been yes - but that
contractual persons have been of a qualitatively different sort from
natural persons. Eliminating the legal recognition by the game of
contracts, however, makes it unclear whether those contracts remain Bn
contracts and thus persons.

I'm willing to hear more gratuitous arguments before rendering my
decision, and while BINA and Agoran precedents don't matter here I do
consider the arguments on the Agoran CFJ to be applicable albeit not
binding. However, I am leaning toward ruling against contractual
personhood, largely on the strength of the current wording of the Bn
rules and specifically that "primarily."

 - teucer
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