Rob Speer on 31 Jan 2004 07:54:36 -0000 |
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Re: [spoon-discuss] Re: [Spoon-business] Let's play the Voting Game! |
On Sat, Jan 31, 2004 at 01:57:00AM -0500, Rob Speer wrote: > Darn. It would have been fun. It makes me want to find the Nash > equilibrium strategy. > > Perhaps all five proposals could be made into non-proposals that you > "vote" on using a different mechanism, and created with a real proposal. Here goes. I can't be mathematically rigorous because there are 32^(number of voters) possible outcomes, but I think I'm looking at the important ones. There's no real advantage to voting no on spam, unless you have a really good strategy involving voting no on more than one proposal. I don't see one. So assume it passes, and you get 30 points for voting no on only one proposal. Any winning strategy then has to do that. With everyone only voting no on one proposal, at most one proposal can fail. There's the odd chance that foo passes, but not with 2/3, and something else fails too; I'm not considering that, because it would require a crazy mix of strategies. Here's a table with the expected value if the proposal on the column is the only one that fails, and the proposal in the row is the one you voted against ('f23' means foo fails to get 2/3 but passes): none f23 foo bar baz qux foo 65 25 30 80 40 80 bar 65 65 60 80 30 30 baz 55 25 60 70 30 70 qux 55 15 60 70 30 70 Voting against qux is dominated by voting against baz, so nobody votes against qux: none f23 foo bar baz foo 65 25 30 80 40 bar 65 65 60 80 30 baz 55 25 60 70 30 Now baz is dominated by bar. none f23 foo bar foo 65 25 30 80 bar 65 65 60 80 And now bar dominates foo. The result: everyone who votes rationally gets 80 points. -- Rob Speer _______________________________________________ spoon-discuss mailing list spoon-discuss@xxxxxxxxx http://lists.ellipsis.cx/mailman/listinfo/spoon-discuss