Kyle H on 25 Nov 2002 00:22:02 -0000


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[eia] retreat and invasion supply


    As far as I can tell, the rules as they are written already entail that if an invasion supply depot is the closest depot, the force must be retreated in that direction (i.e. toward a coast space that is eligible to accept invasion supply).  The rule (7.5.2.10.3.1) reads: "All retreats must be into an adjacent land area that is closest (any closest area, if several qualify equally) to the nearest depot of any nationality in force...".  If the invasion supply depot is closest, I don't see any alternative to retreating the force in that direction. 
    So in retrospect, I would say that what I have proposed in my previous email in relation to invasion supply is more like a clarification or a reminder than a House Rule.
 
kdh
----- Original Message -----
From: J.J. Young
Sent: Sunday, November 24, 2002 12:44 PM
Subject: Re: [eia] couple rules questions

The only thing that worries me about the retreat rules proposed for Great Britain's forces are a combination of the two.  Suppose Great Britain and an ally march out away from the ally's territory to a coastline, where they are supplied by British invasion supply.  This combined force attacks or is attacked and loses.  The 2 proposed rules, acting in combination, would say that the combined force would retreat to stay close to the invasion supply, rather than back towards the ally's territory, and I'm not sure if this makes sense.  What do you guys think ?
 
-JJY
 
----- Original Message -----
From: Kyle H
Sent: Sunday, November 24, 2002 9:34 AM
Subject: [eia] couple rules questions

    On top of the pending question regarding limited access, a couple other (smaller) questions came up when JJ and I resolved our battles.  The first is a genuine question, although its importance is minimal since it is not likely to come up again.  The second issue is more of a request for endorsement than a genuine question, but it is more important, because it is likely to come up again.
 
First question:  Condition H attached to the Withdraw strategy states, "If defender is all cavalry and/or cossacks/freikorps, strategic rating is '+1'."  So what happens if an infantry corps and a cavalry corps are leader-less and, hence, dicing separately.  The first alternative is that the infantry corps gets no modifier to its roll and the cavalry corps gets a +1.  The other alternative is that neither corps gets the +1 because the defending force is not "all cavalry".  [In our battle, JJ rolled well enough so that it didn't matter either way.]  I can see arguments going both ways on this one.  What do you guys think?
 
Second question:  What is the proper procedure for retreating British forces?  For most of us the rules are pretty straightforward and easy to apply.  They say we have to be retreated/withdrawn towards our nearest depot or towards our national capital, whichever is closest.  However, for Great Britain these rules can make for some very odd behavior.  (Use your imagination here.)  So here is a supplement to the rules for retreating which I suggest we adopt to make things a little more realistic for GB.
 
- In the event that Country A is using Combined Movement with Country B, Country A and Country B should be treated as if they were the same country as far as ownership of depots and national capitals is concerned.  (So Country A could be retreated to Country B's depot/capital rather than being retreated in some awkward direction.)
 
- If the nearest eligible depot is one that is off the coast (used for invasion supply), forces that are retreated should be kept on the coast (if possible) so that supply lines are not broken.  [This seems to carry out the spirit of the retreat rules which are to fall back toward your supply lines.]
 
Is there any objection to adopting these supplementary rules by unanimous consent?  They should make British retreats much more reasonable in most cases.  (Notice, though, that these supplementary rules would not have affected the British withdrawal from Genoa at all because Britain was not using combined movement and it had no offshore depots.)
 
kdh